Residential building in Kryvyi Rih city (Dnipropetrovsk region of Ukraine) after Russian rocket attack on December 16, 2022. 4 persons were killed and 13 injured. Source: National Police of Ukraine
The importance of narratives in the conduct of war has almost become a commonplace today. To tell the truth, a few years ago it still seemed ineffective to many, and some Western diplomatic chancelleries were inadvertently borrowing the narratives of what they did not yet dare to call the enemy, first and foremost the main one, Russia. There were certainly a few of us who tried to put them in the spotlight precisely because they were playing into the hands of the enemy, facilitating its aggressive actions and, probably even worse, giving them some credibility. In short, these narratives prevented any response, strengthening the ability to carry out malicious actions. What’s more, we did not counter the Kremlin’s narratives with a counter-narrative that would have allowed us to set the agenda.
Have democracies today managed to correct the situation and show more lucidity in the face of these adverse narratives? Has the finally clear statement of the existence of the “Russian threat” entirely banished fragments of the rhetoric that helps reinforce elements that ultimately serve Moscow? Has the discourse of democracies acquired the maturity required to avoid a situation in which their own words would serve, at least in part, Russia's ambitions? Nothing is less certain. Without even directly mentioning the rhetoric of the Trump administration, which reveals an ideological and practical alignment with Putin’s objectives, the statements of certain European leaders contain argumentative dross that betrays an imperfect clarity.
Words often betray intentions in the double sense of the verb “to betray”. On the one hand, to betray here means to reveal in the sense that words make it possible to discern intentions that cannot be fully exposed in broad daylight, in particular because they could weaken the expression of an official word. Worse still, these intentions could even appear precisely as a betrayal of the resolutions displayed. On the other hand, it means “to thwart” insofar as certain expressions frequently used by these same European governments run counter to a sincerely expressed plan. This is exactly what can be characterized as ambiguity. This is not the strategic ambiguity necessary towards our enemies, but an ambiguity towards those who are supposed to be our friends.
Because that is indeed the current situation with regard to support for Ukraine. The words seem strong, while they remain weak. Resolve is displayed while it is wavering. Understanding of Russia in its revisionist reality is displayed, while actions show that it is far from being fully proven. The warnings from European leaders seem to bear witness to an awareness of the exceptional and abnormal nature of the Russian criminal offensive, while certain words still convey a form of normality. It is this dissonance of thought that we need to understand here, because it is the bearer of a strategic error that is leading us towards catastrophe.
Senseless peace talks
I have often criticized the idea of peace as applied to Russia. To imagine peace as long as the Russian regime is what it is and as long as it has not been defeated by arms is an illusion, if not irresponsible for the future security of Europe and beyond. There is an inherent lie in the idea of peace with Moscow. We know perfectly well that Putin does not want peace, or even a truce. He has not abandoned his plan to conquer or subjugate Ukraine and will continue to destroy it and murder its inhabitants until he has achieved this subservience—unless his army is defeated without question. Even if a so-called peace were to come about, not only would it last only a short time, the time for Moscow to strengthen its army and to polish up new weapons. A relinquishment of part of the Ukrainian territories to Russia would demonstrate to the other nations of the world the nullity and vacuity of the commitments of the Western democracies to the principles of law, as well as their indifference to the fate of the Ukrainian populations martyred under the Russian yoke. It would also be the end of the commitments of the same democracies to the judgment of crimes.
However, instead of ruling on these truths, which are nevertheless obvious, in a clear and straightforward manner, some Western leaders continue to talk about a peace agreement and even sometimes negotiations, as if it could be acceptable for Kyiv to agree to compromises after what has happened, as if the enormity of the crimes committed by the Russians should not lead these leaders to consider it literally intolerable and unworthy of discussions with Putin. There is something inherently rotten about the prospect of any kind of “exchange” with the Russian regime. A process of discussion is all the more absurd given that Ukraine has all the means to win the war if the democracies help it sufficiently, which they are capable of doing if they want to.
It is worth taking a retrospective look at what has happened over the last few months. The radical turnaround in American foreign policy under the presidency of Donald Trump is certainly the decisive factor. We have seen him, as well as his vice-president, ministers and advisers, embrace almost all of the Russian narratives. His agenda seems to be dominated by the conclusion of a so-called peace agreement at any cost and a largely predatory convention with Ukraine. The few disagreements that have arisen with Putin remain the surface of things: as I have written here, the ideological collusion seems almost perfect. The European Union and its member states, as well as Canada and, to some extent, Japan, have reaffirmed their full support for Ukraine and their resolve to arm it further, even if, despite differences between countries, the 0.1% of GDP allocated to arming Ukraine is still far too little.
But above all, the Europeans have indirectly played into Trump’s hands, and therefore into Putin’s, by embracing the discourse of a peace agreement. Even if it is in terms less unfavorable to Kyiv, this discourse remains highly embarrassing. Several European leaders have repeated a very risky statement. They have regularly said that “Ukraine should be put in the best possible conditions when negotiations are opened”. However, this statement is inherently biased, on the one hand because it continues to suggest that negotiations with an undefeated Russia would be possible, and on the other hand because the “best possible conditions” do not mean victory for Kyiv in their minds, but only a limitation of losses.
The statement also remains ambiguous when certain European leaders deplore the fact that Europe and Ukraine are not involved in the peace talks supposedly led by Washington. On the one hand, we can understand their frustration, as revealed by one of the new mantras: “Nothing on Ukraine without Ukraine, nothing on Europe without Europe”. This might seem obvious and a legitimate demand. But on the other hand, the statement itself suggests that Europe and Ukraine should sit down at a negotiating table with Moscow, which not only does not exist, but above all cannot exist. On the contrary, it can be argued that it is in a way fortunate that Europe, i.e. the European Union, the United Kingdom and Norway, and Ukraine were not “invited”. It would have been a trap into which Europe and Ukraine could easily have fallen. The fact that Europe and Ukraine were not involved in these negotiations ultimately seems to be an opportunity; it will enable them to distance themselves from them and, above all, to reject any so-called agreement that would lead to the abandonment of certain territories of Ukraine, and thus to its dismemberment and subjugation.
It is up to us, as Europeans, to take seriously Russia’s rejection of any peace and its desire to continue its war, now and in the future, against Ukraine and Europe. We know that it will not withdraw its troops from Ukraine unless it is forced to do so. It is up to us to declare solemnly that we do not want a Russian-style peace, that is to say a so-called peace that it conceives only as domination and, in reality, as an infinite prolongation of the war. It is up to us to declare that the peace that Ukrainians and Europeans want has nothing to do with what the Americans and Russians pretend to want, which resembles the establishment of a desert.
Security guarantees without victory
Similarly, the narrative about security guarantees appears to be both well-founded and flawed. It is based on irrefutable reasons: it is a question of preventing Ukraine from being attacked again. On the one hand, this requires a strengthened Ukrainian army with all the weapons at its disposal to respond to the enemy, including long-range missiles, fighter jets and bombers, and sufficient anti-aircraft defense systems. On the other hand, Ukraine’s security makes it essential that the Allies make an unwavering commitment to defend it and, at least until Russia is permanently weakened, to have troops on Ukrainian soil both to deter the aggressor and to respond to it by conducting strikes inside Russian territory if necessary. A downsizing of the Ukrainian army and an alleged neutrality—which, moreover, existed before 2014—are not among the acceptable options. Some even mention the need for Ukraine to have the nuclear weapons it had abandoned following the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, but we will not reopen the debate here; it raises questions of a different nature, particularly related to nuclear non-proliferation.
Ukraine’s accession to NATO is certainly one of the possible answers. This certainly seems essential and it is up to Ukraine and the NATO countries to decide, not Russia or any other power. This membership is legitimate and, given the exceptional capabilities of the Ukrainian armed forces, its integration into NATO would bring remarkable added value to the defense of all member countries of the North Atlantic Council. The decision of NATO member countries to admit Kyiv or not is in itself a real test of the seriousness of their resolve.
However, we must beware of two potential illusions. The first is that, in the current international context, NATO membership is not, as it never has been, an absolute and total guarantee, since the activation of Article 5 depends on a unanimous decision of the Council. Moreover, even if the principle of activating Article 5 is decided upon, this does not imply a decision by each of the Member States to intervene to defend the country under attack. So it all depends on the number of states that volunteer, their operational decisions—what level of strikes on Russian territory?—and the combined power of the states that would commit. The second illusion is to think of the Atlantic Alliance as a kind of eternal alliance with, in particular, the United States necessarily on board. The now recurring question of NATO’s appearance after the de facto or de jure departure of the United States and its capabilities is anything but theoretical. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to consider that even Ukraine’s necessary accession to NATO is in itself an irrefutable security guarantee.
The issue of security guarantees must be restored to its doctrinal complexity prior to its implementation. One of its components is certainly the sending of troops from mainly European countries that volunteer, and this was mentioned as early as February 26, 2024, by Emmanuel Macron. However, the accounts have already evolved. While the initial idea was to secure Ukraine during the war, after Trump’s announcements—we cannot really speak of a plan as the process has been flawed from the outset—it has become a method to guarantee Ukraine’s security after the conclusion of a so-called peace agreement. However, under the current conditions, an agreement to this effect would endorse the de facto or de jure abandonment of certain territories to Russia, which would change, beyond anything else, the very basis of Ukraine’s security. Firstly, it would be an illusion of security; secondly, such security guarantees would take place in the context of a Russia that is not defeated, and therefore more aggressive and ultimately better armed.
Security guarantees without a victory for Ukraine and without a defeat for Russia would have only limited and precarious weight, particularly if the allied forces do not have a clear mission to fully re-establish Kyiv’s sovereignty over its territory and, logically, a firm commitment to strike Russian territory at the slightest offensive action by Moscow. In this very respect, any semblance of a peace agreement would be nipped in the bud, certainly because of the permanence of Russian revisionism, but also because of the unacceptability of a status quo based on Russia's capture of part of Ukrainian territory.
This is undoubtedly the ambiguity of the recent statements on security guarantees. In principle, it is fair, especially when accompanied by a solemn declaration on the indispensable nature of Ukraine’s territorial integrity, its massive armament now and in the future, and its planned and immediate accession to NATO. It leads to confusion if it is accompanied by the statement of a possible negotiation with Russia and the prospect of an amputated Ukraine. In that case, security guarantees would be a rather pitiful sham that would guarantee nothing, especially not the current and future security of Ukraine and the whole of Europe.
Partial defeats and tomorrow’s revenge
One of the most perverse aspects of truncated, ambiguous and often approximate narratives is that they distance us from the perception of reality. They mix the exposition of principles that are perfectly accurate in terms of international law and, moreover, of basic political rules in any democracy, with solutions that are radically antagonistic to them. In the specific case of Russia, this leads to a misunderstanding of the Kremlin’s specificity, the very undertaking of which is in radical opposition to any diplomatic action. The ideology put in place by Putin, which is inseparable from his large-scale crimes, is in total contradiction with the stated resolutions to conduct a diplomatic endeavor.
To repeat, even with all the usual precautions, that the intention is to find a peaceful solution with Moscow, while proclaiming respect for the fundamental rules of international law, reveals both a more or less deliberate oversight of history and a conceptual misunderstanding of the reality of Russian power. Or sometimes, even worse, it is as if Russia were other than it is. Diplomacy thus presents itself as a game of shadows, displaying falsehoods to stick to its logic, but it cannot achieve any results. It maintains the illusion that discussion with Moscow is possible, which has never been the case in the last twenty-five years. The almost mechanical proclamation of a diplomatic course obscures reality, induces confusion in public opinion and often even among the proponents of this discourse—a classic element of cognitive dissonance—and can distract from the only possible objective in realistic terms: the victory of Ukraine.
The almost mechanical and reflex-like repetition of the diplomatic refrain, even when accompanied by the statement of fundamental objectives such as the territorial integrity of Ukraine, the punishment of crimes, the return of deported children and the payment of war reparations, which everyone knows can never be completed through diplomatic channels, already constitutes a double defeat. This would certainly endorse Ukraine’s defeat, even if it were better protected from future aggression, but ours too.
Because that is exactly what Putin wants: to trap the West in its intrinsic contradictions and expose its incoherence, which is deeply destructive of all thought—and, therefore, of all strategy. He has this coherence, even if it is based on absolute lies and the scuttling of all truth and all principles. He obeys the vertical of evil, while the West is proving incapable of defending truth and justice. Russia is totally straightforward in its organized enterprise of destruction, while the West is tacking back and forth in its defense of the law. To talk about diplomacy with Putin is to delegitimize democracies’ own principles, because it is to concede a defeat which, as I have pointed out here, is by no means certain. And even if Russia were to achieve only a partial victory, it would be to prepare for an even more destructive revenge. Not to understand that we are facing an all-or-nothing situation is to abdicate either reason or responsibility, or both.
It is also in this sense that the new formula used in the chancelleries of “just and lasting peace” must be analyzed. President Zelenskyy also felt obliged to adopt it himself so as not to offend his allies. He also has a much stricter meaning than most. But one of two things: either we consider this formula strictly and use it precisely, or we turn it into a rhetorical form that has no consequences. In the latter case, either, against all reason, one would still hope for a change in Russia, or one would ultimately fail to perceive the devastating effects of a false discourse that distorts the meaning of words, or, ignominiously, one would be prepared in advance to one day rush headlong into betrayal.
Indeed, speaking of a just peace would be contradictory to letting Moscow still have control over part of the occupied territories and letting Russian criminals go unpunished. Talking about a lasting peace would be ineffective without Russia’s defeat. Everything but the mad knows this. Claiming that it could be otherwise boils down to one word: lying.