Reassessing Transatlanticism

The Age of Europe’s Maturity and the Enforcement of International Law

Vladimir Putin presented Donald Trump and his wife with the official 2018 FIFA World Cup ball and wished the United States of America a successful World Cup 2026. July 16, 2018. Source: Website of the President of the Russian Federation www.kremlin.ru

First, a few words to apologize for my silence for a month and a half on Tenzer Strategics: a new book, to be published in France on April 23, 2025, is the main reason. A few days before that, the paperback and updated version of Our War. Crime and Oblivion will also be released, which should reach an even wider audience. This blog, consisting solely of long reads, will resume at a much more frequent pace from now on. Thank you for your understanding and enduring support.

In several recent discussions with American and European colleagues and friends, a controversial topic has been regularly raised: Does the Trump era constitute a lasting break in the transatlantic bond to which we should now become accustomed and from which we should fully draw the practical consequences, or is it an additional difficulty, certainly, or a notable point of friction, but one that should not prevent us from reaffirming, in spite of ourselves, the strength of this bond? The question has several variants, notably whether this would be a bad four-year period to wait before a return to normal, or, on the contrary, a fundamental fact of American politics from now on, regardless of who occupies the White House, for at least the next decade. To put it another way, some see Trump, especially in his second term, as a radical departure, while others see only an accentuation of trends already present in American politics, including under Barack Obama and Joe Biden.

In fact, the response of the traditional allies of the United States, European countries, but also major democracies in the Asia-Pacific region (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Australia in particular) cannot be the same depending on whether or not America is considered to have switched to the opposing side, whether Trump constitutes a radical change or simply an evolution, certainly a little, whether what he represents, embodies and, above all, undertakes constitutes a lasting or time-limited phenomenon. Such judgments cannot be considered independently of an assessment of the internal evolution of the United States, with this question also applying to foreign policy: will Trump commit the irreparable?

There are various possible prisms of analysis: the concrete decisions, the ideology that underlies them, their medium-term consequences (with the question of potential ruptures always present), and of course the particular historical context, that of war first and foremost, which influences their scope. Some might say that there is a perspective that tends to favor moderation less in the observation than in the method, and another that gives precedence to the most radical hypothesis. Both can certainly be wrong, but my general observation—which also guided my analysis of the Russian war against Ukraine in several articles here and in Notre Guerre—is that the most frequent tendency is to underestimate the scale of the phenomena and to refuse an overly radical analysis, and that this was the origin of the leaders’ errors of assessment. I therefore fear that we will have to favor the most brutal hypotheses here. We are, after all, returning to the age of extremes.

Allow me to make a personal remark: I have always been a strong advocate of the transatlantic link. Even when I opposed certain actions, and often failures to act, of the United States, I continued to believe that this unwavering relationship should be fostered in the common interest of Europe and Washington. Neither the second Gulf War, which I condemned while acknowledging that passivity in the face of Saddam Hussein’s mass crimes was not an option, nor the culpably weak resolve of Presidents Obama and Biden in the face of, in particular, the crimes against humanity of the Assad and Putin regimes, which I criticized more than others in Syria and Ukraine, prevented me from advocating that, without naivety or abstention in denunciations, on should maintain this privileged and, to tell the truth, unique relationship. Together, the United States, Europe, but also democratic nations elsewhere, have a force that is incomparable to that of dictatorships. But things change radically from the moment Washington falls in with the worst dictatorships. We cannot think and act as if this prospect remains unlikely.

Continuities and breaks

Some are trying to reassure themselves by pointing out the elements of continuity between the Obama, Biden and Trump administrations, knowing that his second presidency promises to be incredibly more brutal and radical than the first. Certainly, Obama and Biden were far from perfect on Russia and Ukraine. The former came up with the madness that was the reset even though Moscow had occupied 20% of Georgian territory since the previous year, in 2008. He refused to act after the invasion of Crimea and part of the Donbass in 2014-2015, which is not unrelated to the absurd Minsk II agreements, in which, moreover, France’s President François Hollande harbored no illusions. After 2022, the latter did not help Ukraine as much as it could and should have done, and was undoubtedly ready to give in at the end and move towards an unacceptable compromise. There was neither willingness nor plan to defeat Russia. He thus left the door open to Trump’s proposals which, if applied as they stand, would not only lead to the disappearance of Ukraine, but would also prepare the ground for a future war in Europe that would be even more brutal and widespread. Joe Biden has not acted in accordance with his historical obligations. He has also blocked Kyiv’s accession to NATO. We also find in him a form of unilateralism and a limited concern for the Allies, particularly in the absence of consultation with them during the withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan, not to mention AUKUS. Trump took his threats against the International Criminal Court to the extreme, but there was bitter criticism of him in the Biden administration. Neither Obama nor he had sought, not only because of the likely blockage of Congress, to become a party to the Rome Statute.

It can also be noted that the protectionist measures announced by the real estate magnate are in line with measures already enacted under the Biden presidency. They could constitute a new milestone, but they are not an absolute novelty. Joe Biden had already introduced measures such as the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) that reflected an inspiration in line with America First. The Chips and Science Act, understandable in its intention because it obeyed essential strategic objectives, could also ultimately work against Taiwan.

The fact remains that the second Trump presidency is of a different nature. I had already pointed out here, before he officially entered the White House, that Trump had nothing but contempt for international law and the rule of law in general. This logically led him to make a mockery of the self-determination of peoples, their fight for freedom and their struggle for respect for territorial integrity. For Trump, people do not exist. He lives in a world where there is no longer an aggressor or an assaulted country, no longer a culprit or a victim, no longer justice or malfeasance. In his universe, everything is infinitely relative and there are no longer any norms, lies or truths. We know all too well that this is the narrative and cognitive pattern of dictatorships. It opens the door to all kinds of revisionism. The fact that Trump reveres the so-called great powers and mocks small and medium-sized states—during which characterizes others than him—is only the logical conclusion of this systematic destruction of all rules.

Trump’s remarks not only on Greenland, Panama and Canada, but even more so on Gaza and Ukraine, are along these lines. We can, and must, condemn the crimes against humanity, even genocide, committed by Hamas, but that does not authorize depriving the Gazans of their land. We cannot declare, with indifference, that perhaps one day Ukraine will be Russian, as if this theft of territory and this enslavement of Ukrainians could be considered lawful, in moral terms, but also in legal terms. Russia cannot be given permission to continue its crimes, its acts of torture, its mass rapes and deportations of children, which would be the case if Ukrainian territories remained under Russian rule. Nor can we, without losing all credibility, refuse any security guarantees to an ally. Finally, we cannot come to an agreement with one of the worst criminals against humanity in the world, Vladimir Putin, on the back of a democracy. Biden at least named things, namely mass crimes, if not acted; for Trump, mass crime is now cleared.

Tomorrow, there are many signs that such an abandonment could affect Taiwan and, at the same time, America’s traditional allies in Asia. Here too, the concerns are not entirely new, but there is a growing awareness that Trump could go all the way with the abandonment. It has often been said that with Trump, America had become unpredictable. Some felt that this unpredictability could worry dictators more than democracies. American politics now appears dramatically predictable—with a grim clarity. Trump is even beyond the classic debate between isolationism and interventionism. His interventionism, so conducive to dictatorships—in the immediate term to the totalitarian Russian regime—is perhaps the supreme mark of isolationism. America isolates itself from its Allies and makes the policy of its traditional enemies.

Until recently, many still believed that it might be possible to convince Trump with rational and logical arguments, playing on his possible emotions. It could be argued that his agreement with Putin at the expense of Ukraine and in defiance of European security would make him appear weak and encourage his declared main adversaries, China and Iran in particular. This argument has no chance of working, because Trump lacks all the fundamental elements of logical understanding. The problem is not only that his discourse is post-truth, but that this is the way his own mind is structured.

Can America become the enemy of the free world?

It is a commonplace observation that today’s American leaders hold a discourse fundamentally opposed to the values of freedom on which the United States was built. People like J.D. Vance, still in Munich on February 13, 2025, Elon Musk and Trump himself not only embrace illiberal, even fascist, values, but they claim them as such, even though they sometimes claim to do so in the name of freedom. When one thus declares war on the truth, one is in reality waging war on freedom. The Trump administration’s domestic policy is moving in this direction, not only with radical anti-migrant measures, but even more so with the blows dealt to institutions and administrations. Under the guise of rationalization and efficiency, the DOGE has undertaken a methodical operation to destroy the checks and balances and places of internal regulation of the American administration—from development aid to internal security, from health to archives (with a potential risk to the preservation and transmission of American history), from the energy sector to defense.

Should we or can we reassure ourselves by saying that this will have no impact on US foreign policy? Can Europeans consider that those who hold a discourse hostile to the principles of freedom internally can continue to remain our best allies externally? The answer is no, because the logic of hostility that we see at work leads inexorably to getting closer to our enemies. The elements of a plan for Ukraine put forward to date by the Trump administration are exactly what Moscow was expecting. Trump's statement on his Truth Social network after his phone call with Putin, as well as the statements made by Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth in Brussels on February 12, 2025, amount to giving Russia an absolute advantage and calling into question the sovereignty and integrity of Ukraine. The very fact of refusing to condemn Russian aggression and of meeting a man, Putin, indicted for war crimes by the International Criminal Court is tantamount to blatant collusion. The parallel re-engagement of Washington with Lukashenka’s criminal regime in Belarus is also an ominous turning point.

In the world of Trump and his ilk, only the so-called great states count. The reverence of the head of the White House towards Putin, the signs, already present during his first presidency, of an admiration for the Kremlin mafioso, will undoubtedly also apply to Xi Jinping. Trump is prepared to strike any kind of deal with revisionist dictatorships without any consideration for other states, both in Europe and in Asia. The desire for the United States to re-engage with Russia could thus lead to particularly dangerous developments, including the lifting of some of the American sanctions against Moscow, which would give the Russian economy a much-needed boost. The European countries, the European Union as well as the United Kingdom, which should thus reassess its “special relationship” with America, must take this into account as much as the great Asian democracies bound by security agreements with Washington. Trump, by helping Russia, is acting in the medium term in line with China's ideological desires. In the long term, it is China that will reap the rewards of the destruction of Europe; in the short term, it is Moscow that will be strengthened, whereas with sustained and a fortiori more intense military pressure, it could be defeated within a few years.

Under these circumstances, the fundamental principles and commitments of the Alliance are defeated. Hegseth’s remarks, despite a reaffirmation of NATO membership that remains purely rhetorical, show that the United States is no longer the fundamental partner of the Alliance, and this is a turning point all the more important as it was based on it. NATO, already weakened by the questioning of the credibility of the American guarantee, is changing completely and, in fact, seems on the verge of disappearing, leaving its European member countries and Canada facing an unprecedented vacuum. Essentially, what would the Alliance mean if its main member state were to grant the enemy, unilaterally and without even the slightest hint of reciprocity, more than it could ever have hoped for in its wildest dreams? We are no longer even in a traditionally isolationist situation where the main ally would withdraw, leaving the others helpless, but in a world where the ally potentially becomes an enemy. It is an uncomfortable truth, but it must be stated in these terms, however crude they may be.

Some American colleagues and friends, and sometimes even European ones, still believe that, in the end, Trump will support Kyiv, understand that Putin's Russia is also the enemy of the United States and will see Ukraine as the front line where the defense of the free world is at stake. They cling to a few phrases from this or that advisor to forge a scenario in which the worst would not be certain. To tell the truth, after Trump’s election and before he was inaugurated, such a scenario might have been given some credence. Today, it seems like a fantasy, albeit a sincere one, but one with zero credibility. Russia, China and Trump’s America will certainly not be allies, but these three powers could form an unlikely and, on the American side, involuntary implicit coalition. It would result in the marginalization of Europe and other small and medium powers if they do not resist. No scenario is ever certain, but this could well be the current trend. We cannot count on internal resistance in the United States. Trump’s advisers, who may realize the logical consequence of their leader’s policies, as was the case during Trump’s first term, will have no way of opposing it.

The consequences of the end of transatlanticism: elements for an answer

For a long time, several international relations analysts and members of government have been calling for a rapid intensification of Europe’s defense effort. In truth, it is not only an intensification that Europe needs, but a change of scale and nature in its military spending. It is a question of Europe moving to a war economy, with all the consequences that this implies in terms of mobilizing a large part of the European population in this endeavor in favor of defense. Given the scale of the threat, half-measures will remain insufficient. Rapidly moving to at least 4% of GDP in defense spending in all countries of Europe in the broad sense is a fairly brutal and radical undertaking. Purely incremental decisions will not achieve this. What are known as contingency measures are actually long-term measures, but they must be almost immediate.

Decisions as crucial as this that will turn the lives of European citizens upside down will also be ruled out if we continue to lull the European population into delusions about the continuation of peace in the country they live in, as if the war were going to stop at the territory of Ukraine. We must therefore stop pretending that “we are not at war with Russia”, as some leaders have been repeating until recently. Moreover, as I suggested as early as February 24, 2022, and even before, the Western armies should have engaged in the war a long time ago, even if at that time it was limited and without ground troops. Having failed to make this decision, European leaders will have to face a much more brutal, profound and widespread war, which will require more resources than they would have had to commit if they had made this decision earlier.

In short, the question that has been on people’s minds for several years, without an answer being provided, “What if the United States is no longer on our side?”, has taken on a very particular urgency. It requires leadership that is rare in Europe today. But even more importantly, it must provide an answer to a much more radical question: “What if the United States plays against us?” as Trump is currently doing? Europe was not prepared to face this existential question which completely changes the reality of the Transatlantic Alliance since it destroys it.

In short, Europe is now being called upon to confront not only a clearly defined enemy, Russia, and tomorrow also China, but also a former ally that could transform itself, for a period of time that is impossible to determine today, into an adversary. Europe must immediately and first of all stand firm against Washington in Ukraine. This requires three immediate commitments.

Firstly, Europe must reject any so-called peace agreement negotiated directly between the Russian and American capitals. Together with Ukraine, it must not only say that it is unacceptable, but also show through its actions that it is. In other words, it will have to dramatically increase its arms deliveries to Ukraine—hence the need to switch to a war economy—and, as soon as possible, send troops to Ukraine to deter Russia and defend the security of the country under attack. Its commitment must be unambiguous: it must stand alongside Ukraine, whatever the cost of victory, and until the end, that is, until Ukraine has recovered all its territories. To put it straightforwardly, Europe has to become the entity committed to enforcing international law, at first in Ukraine.

Then, particularly if the United States were to abandon them, it will have to maintain and even intensify its sanctions against Moscow and introduce secondary sanctions, which could then also target American companies that enter into commercial agreements with Russia. For too long, Europe has, under false pretenses, delayed the full seizure of the 200 billion euros of frozen assets from the Russian Central Bank located in Europe. It will have to transfer these sums to Ukraine, which will have to use them as a priority to purchase European weapons—which again presupposes a considerable acceleration of their production in Europe and the United Kingdom. Agreements could be concluded to this effect with our partners in Asia, who would also have every interest in embarking on the path of a more structured defense relationship with Europe, particularly if NATO were to fail. The same goes for Canada.

Finally, on a much broader level, with America likely to become increasingly absent in its relations with Asian, African and even Latin American countries, Europe and the developed countries of Asia must take up the slack. The recent decisions to suspend American aid and dismantle US-AID give rise to fears of such a development. In terms of investment, Europe must put itself in a position to do more, much more, which will, as in the case of defense, force European countries to make drastic choices.

For some time now, some of us have been talking about the possibility of the death of Europe. This is becoming, as if by a form of acceleration of history, a possibility not only intellectually, but also physically. Let us not sink into defeatism: there is still time, for a few more hours or weeks, to disprove the most pessimistic prophecies about the end of European history—and that of freedom.