Spider’s Web: a Technological and Operational Feat for Ukraine, But Also a Strategic One
The Ukrainian Operation of June 1, 2025 Has Long-Term Political Implications
Ukraine attacks Russia’s strategic bombers at Belaya air base deep inside Russia. June 1, 2025. Source: Security Service of Ukraine
Much has already been written about the prodigious operation carried out by the Ukrainian security services (SBU). Never before has such an operation been carried out, not only with the same modus operandi, but also with the same degree of destruction, at least since Pearl Harbor. Forty-one Russian military aircraft were damaged and some destroyed, including several strategic bombers that Moscow is no longer able to rebuild. Thirty-four percent of Russian bombers were hit. Basically, 10 to 30% of Russia’s nuclear deterrent air force has been wiped out. All this is unprecedented.
It can be said with certainty that today no intelligence service would be capable of carrying out an operation of this magnitude so far into enemy territory and striking four remote bases at the same time. Even Mossad, undoubtedly the best service in the world today, now after the SBU, neither MI6 nor the CIA seem capable of demonstrating such innovation and composure, as shown by the delivery of the drones that carried out the attack to Russia itself and the perfectly organized departure of those who delivered them.
In any case, none of the aforementioned Western services has ever attempted to carry out such an operation against Russia, either in this way or in any other, and this fact alone speaks for itself—we will come back to this. This operation, about which the Ukrainians have provided numerous details—a weapon of mass communication both for the Allies and the Russian population—will be taught for a long time as a textbook case.
When we consider the role of these bombers in launching cruise missiles and gliding bombs that struck hospitals, schools, playgrounds, markets, and residential buildings in Ukraine, we can immediately conclude that this operation saved lives—which is undoubtedly the most important achievement. Of course, Moscow still has ample resources to continue committing these war crimes and crimes against humanity, but its potential will be weakened in part, and the disabling of some of its surveillance aircraft, notably two A-50 AWACS, could also reduce its military intelligence capabilities.
For my part, I have often highlighted in two books and numerous essays and television programs the unique technological ingenuity of the Ukrainians, which ultimately makes me optimistic about their ultimate victory—something that those who have never returned to Ukraine since February 24, 2022, assuming they ever went there before, cannot understand. The operations carried out by the Ukrainians against refineries, oil and ammunition depots, and certain general officers guilty of countless war crimes and crimes against humanity had already amply demonstrated this. But I admit that I never thought such an operation was possible—I believe that few even dreamed of it.
Commentators have also said too little about another feat: this operation, conceived and planned over a year ago, was not leaked, which is a sign, if ever there was one, of the elimination of Russian moles within the SBU and the presidential administration, but also of the institutional cohesion of Ukraine. It is also striking that foreign and allied intelligence services were not aware of it either. This could have been potentially dangerous for the US, and the services of other countries could have done everything in their power to dissuade the Ukrainians from undertaking such an operation because of its extraordinary nature.
My aim here is not to draw military lessons, which would be beyond my competence, but to elaborate on how Spider’s Web is rich in strategic consequences and political implications and is already beginning to shape Ukraine’s future role in the security of the continent—and even beyond. However, I am not certain that the “Allies” have fully understood the strategic lessons masterfully taught by the Ukrainians, and this could have dramatic consequences for them. Yet it is their military-strategic doctrine that Spider’s Web calls for rethinking. This is a pressing emergency.
Four potential strategic revolutions