Welcome to the Refugees!
Let’s be Consistent in our Fight Against the Causes of Political Migration
Refugee children from Syria at a clinic in Ramtha, northern Jordan, Picture: Russell Watkins/Department for International Development, 28 August 2013
The use by the criminal regime of Belarus of migrants, who were purposely brought to this country, is one of the worst abominations of recent months. Most of them are people who are persecuted by murderous regimes and are looking for the slightest opportunity to flee and should be considered as refugees. This tactic, which is an exploitation of the misery of human beings, should not make us forget—because it is also one of Lukashenka’s aims—the brutal repression of this illegitimate president against his opponents.
The use of this new weapon certainly raises the question of the necessary protection of the European Union’s borders. However, it cannot be the sole or even the more focus. The problem is not, in fact, that of a “migration crisis”, in the sense that the “problem” of migration, which has been provoked here, would be primary, but rather of the use of a form of what is often called “hybrid warfare” against European democracies.
In reality, it is necessary to consider two questions that it is inappropriate to separate. The first is the cause of political migration, that is, the influx of refugees from countries, mainly Syria, which is linked to a question of life and death. The fact that in the case of its use by the Belarusian regime does not change this fundamental fact. The second is the action of dictatorial and aggressive regimes that intend to threaten Europe by all possible means. Among these, the first is certainly the Russian regime, which has shown unwavering support, even to the point of perpetuating massive war crimes, to the Assad regime, but also to the Belarusian regime. Nothing would have happened, neither the maintenance of Assad and Lukashenka in power, nor the use of these children, women and men, as a weapon of war, if there had not been this support.
This is not the first time that the Putin regime has used this weapon. Through its support for the Damascus regime, accompanied since the fall of 2015 by the presence and offensive action of Russian forces in Syria, the Kremlin has already used this weapon against Europe, and in an even more massive way. The ways of proceeding are certainly completely different, but the desired effects are largely identical. The Kremlin hoped that the resulting influx of Syrian refugees into Europe—even though Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon are taking in many more—would lead to a rise in tensions and, in particular, to the rise of the far right in the European Union, a far right that is obviously an unconditional supporter of the Syrian and Russian regimes. He has almost succeeded. In a way, Putin intended to exacerbate the potential contradictions in Europe between, on the one hand, the affirmation of its values and the rule of law—in particular the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees—and, on the other, reactions in the opposite direction, i.e., closure and questioning of these liberal principles.
Today, once again, Europe seems to be caught in this trap. It is once again showing cognitive dissonance on at least two levels. On the one hand, it blames the Lukashenka regime, obviously with good reason since the Belarusian dictator should be held accountable for his crimes, but seems once again reluctant to name the main instigator, even if it is perhaps indirect. This is similar to Angela Merkel’s attitude: at the same time—and history will pay tribute to her on this point—welcoming Syrian refugees in the name of eminent principles and being incredibly conciliatory towards Moscow—Nord Stream 2, the allegedly balanced position on the Russian war against Ukraine, and on this history will be severe. On the other hand, the European Union condemns, again rightly, the use by Belarus, with the complicity of the Russian—at least in this case a nihil obstat—and Syrian regimes mainly, of unfortunate people as a weapon against Europe, but persists in doing nothing against the very causes of what it perceives as a threat. Yet the main threat is not so much the influx of refugees in itself—no one can claim that these few hundred, or even thousands, represent a danger to Europe—as the objectives that these regimes pursue.
Europe in search of solutions? Is it really?
In the face of this situation, the EU and the United States have certainly spoken harsh words to the Belarusian regime. They have obtained from Turkey that flights to Belarus may not carry migrants from Syria, Iraq and Yemen on board. Iraq has pledged to repatriate its nationals who wish to return voluntarily. Unsurprisingly, neither Syria nor Lebanon have committed themselves in this sense—but, fearing sanctions, which it had curiously escaped until now, the Syrian private airline Cham Wings, linked to the Assad clan through the intermediary of its cousin Rami Makhlouf and particularly active in this traffic, finally announced that it was giving up operating its flights to Minsk. As for Moscow, it merely indicated that, after Lukashenka’s threats to cut off gas supplies to Europe through Belarus, gas deliveries would continue—which can also be understood as additional pressure, after the blackmail of the last month, for the certification of Nord Stream 2. Meanwhile, the Russian Foreign Ministry continues to blame Poland for the affair, taking care not to accuse Minsk and its Syrian accomplices of anything. On the contrary, it asks the EU to resume contact with the Belarusian authorities, which would amount to legitimizing this regime. However, some people are still naive enough—if not hypocritical enough—to think that it is appropriate to appeal to Moscow to solve the problems created by the Belarusian regime. For the rest, the EU has been careful not to define concrete measures against the regime and its associates.
By showing a primary concern for the migration issue, the EU risks falling into a double trap.
The first would be to consider migration as the first problem to be solved, while the issue—the weaponization of migration—has less to do with the nature of the “weapon” than with the fact that regimes are attacking us. In a mostly unintentional way, this narrative provides a form of legitimization for the parties and personalities that make it as such one of the main threats to Europe. It is perfectly possible to take into consideration the concern of Poland, but also to a lesser extent of Lithuania or Latvia, for their territorial integrity and sovereignty. This concern has a strong historical resonance that it would be fatal to deny. However, it must be firmly, if not implacably, dissociated from the issue of migration.
The second trap would be not to consider first the danger that the Lukashenka regime represents as such not only for his own people, but also for the EU. From this point of view, it is impossible not to put the Russian and Belarusian regimes on the same level. Both carry out attacks on European soil—in the case of Belarus, we recall the boarding of the Ryan Air flight that led to the arrest of Raman Pratasevich and his fiancée, Sofia Sapega—; both have mafia-like behaviors—the recent case of the trafficking of migrants suggests lucrative complicity on the part of the regime in their ransom; both maintain relations with regimes that are like themselves or worse, such as Assad’s Syria, which is largely instrumental in this trafficking; both have not only declared war on the European Union and its values, but they intend to prevent the universal principles of the rule of law, human rights and freedom from extending to them when their people demand it. It is these attacks that must demand a response, not primarily the issue of migration, even if it is instrumentalized by the Belarusian regime. A “militarized” response on this point alone would be all the more inappropriate as it would make it the center of attention, risking distracting us from attacks that are far more dangerous and massive.
Without a clear discourse on all these points, and especially without decisive action, the EU is also only reinforcing the focus on the migration issue, which would be a blessing for these regimes. Here we find the cognitive dissonance that is one of the main threats to the European Union.
Of course, the measures to be taken are known. Several were recently mentioned by an excellent paper, both in terms of its overall position on the migration issue, and in the detail of its proposals. Its authors suggest, among other things, to define a broad target of persons, natural and legal, who have assisted in the smuggling of migrants, and to place them under sanctions—including the freezing or seizure of assets abroad—and to prohibit European companies from pursuing or entering into contracts with these entities. It is also known that the sanctions regime against Belarusian regime’s cronies is still incomplete and that the first circle of the dictator in particular still indirectly benefits from the existing economic relations between this country and EU companies. These must be stopped. Finally, with regard to the Russian regime, we expect at least more resolution in the implementation of anti-corruption sanctions against certain personalities closely linked to the regime. But this would require the European Union and the United States not to stand on the sidelines and to adopt a comprehensive plan to roll back these regimes.
Borders and future integration
The question of the borders of the European Union is a recurrent debate, and any perspective that considers essentially natural territorial borders on the European continent would not make much sense. Enlargement is a political issue that I have already dealt with extensively here, both globally and in the specific case of Ukraine. I will not return to it. But the issue brought to the forefront with what is seen as a threat to the borders by the Belarusian regime’s offensive use of migrant trafficking raises less the question of the border than of the non-border. It makes what is outside, at least on the continental level, of the Union seem like a threat that would require protection.
But the question must be turned around: what the Lukashenko regime is doing is a threat precisely because its actions are in direct opposition to the fundamental values of the European Union. It is not Belarus as a country that poses a problem, but its threats that are closely linked to the anti-liberal and anti-democratic ideology of its illegitimate regime. This is the only reason why the EU has a closed border with Belarus, not any other reason. Let us imagine—and this is not only to be hoped for, but also to be encouraged—that the regime changes to a liberal government that corresponds to the expectations of the majority of the Belarusian people, and the view of the border would change completely. The border is related to the threat, not the threat to the border. It is not for nothing that Ukraine rightly considers itself to be at the forefront of the fight to defend Europe’s border against an external threat, in this case that of the Russian regime, and for this reason wishes that the principle of its access to the European Union could be recognized, regardless of the problems of corruption that would make this accession impossible today.
It is therefore essential that the EU member countries recognize this reality. Supporting the liberal opposition in exile in Belarus is linked to the founding principles of the Union, and it also corresponds to our conception of a broad Europe whose protection rests on the liberal regimes that are part of it. For understandable reasons of prudence, the opposition may not be calling for such a prospect of accession today, but when it comes to power, this prospect will necessarily be its own, and it must also be that of the European Union. We cannot accept the propaganda that this would be a “provocation” to Moscow: no state, unless it is driven by an aggressive and expansionist perspective, can consider that the logical result of the existence of a government driven by liberal and democratic principles is a threat to it.
The use of migrant smuggling as a weapon today calls for a principled reflection that goes far beyond what is described as a “crisis.” There is, in fact, no crisis and what the Lukashenko regime is doing is just another episode that goes, as Franak Viačorka, one of Svietlana Tsikhanouskaya’s top advisors, recently pointed out, from stealing the 2020 election to the massive repression of dissidents, from heavy prison sentences for some presidential candidates to the “liquidation” of NGOs and free media, from the attempted kidnapping of an Olympic athlete to the murder of opponents. Add to this the forced exile of thousands of Belarusian citizens, which in many ways is not so different from the forced exile of refugees from criminal regimes or violent conflicts. There is no “crisis” because there is a continuity of repression and offensive actions. The regime in Belarus is, from this point of view, only a link in a chain that constitutes an alliance of dictatorial and criminal regimes. It is about them and not about these “migrants.” Or rather, we should talk about forced migrations as the result of these regimes.
Our values and our security
Thinking separately about values and security is probably one of the worst mistakes Western governments often make. First, as has often been rightly noted, the worst atrocities that regimes commit at home, when they have the means to do so, is the best predictor of future external aggression. Second, the abandonment of our values, even by illiberal regimes that may have the same security concerns as we do, lends weight to the dictatorships’ narratives. As a result, their security concerns are weakened, if not delegitimized. Finally, this other cognitive dissonance leads to considering the effects and being alarmed by them without fighting the causes. It leads some governments to think that it is possible to enclose themselves and that they will thus be protected from the tumult of war—an idea I have already done justice to.
The debate on migration and, in particular, on the exodus of refugees must be conducted through this prism and no other. We may have the right to consider that migrants are not welcome—whatever the moral disapproval that this assertion arouses in every liberal and every democrat—but then we must provide the means to do so. And the means is not to block the border, to push these migrants back, or to grant them too little asylum and protection—which many European countries have done for Syrian, Libyan, Eritrean, Afghan, etc. and sometimes even Belarussian refugees—but to put an end to the causes of political migration. The only way is either to fight against these regimes or, when possible, to help resolve the conflicts. To want, for example, to send Syrian refugees back to their country, as the Danish government ignominiously does against the fundamental principles of the European Union, is not only a betrayal of these principles, but also a nail in Europe’s primary legitimacy. This only accentuates, especially with regard to third countries, not only the peoples fighting for freedom in the Middle East and in the world, but also—it must be emphasized—dictatorial regimes, the feeling of cowardice of the countries of the Union, of incoherence and ultimately of weakness. There is a link between this and our weakness in the fight against dictatorships. This is also the signal we are sending out by showing our reluctance, even our opposition, to the reception of political refugees.
The present “crisis” is therefore not, as we have said, a migratory crisis, but a far more fundamental and lasting crisis: that of our principles and that of our will. If, in the end, it reveals something about Europe—but the lesson is tragically old—it is on this level. It is this crisis that we must put an end to by reinforcing our actions against dictatorial and criminal regimes, both in Europe and elsewhere. I only hope that it is not too late.